n0n Extortion Group Lists 38 Maritime Organizations in One Batch; Shared Vendor Source Suspected
DeepSeas TIDEThreat Intelligence Discovery and ExploitationExecutive summary
On 12 October 2026 the data-theft extortion group n0n added 38 maritime and logistics organizations to its leak site in a single batch: container terminals, shipping lines, ferry and tanker operators, port IT providers, agencies and 3PLs across 18 countries, 12 of them in South Korea. DeepSeas TIDE reviewed the site directly on 14 October 2026. All 38 listings share one publication deadline, 19 October 2026, 13:27 UTC, and ransom demands run from USD 600,000 to USD 14 million.
None of the 38 organizations has publicly confirmed a breach, and DeepSeas TIDE found no regulator filing or company disclosure for any of them between April and October 2026. Dongkuk Steel has stated it has confirmed no damage. The claims remain unverified.
Published: 2026-10-14 · Author: DeepSeas TIDE
DeepSeas Threat Intelligence Discovery & Exploitation (TIDE) team monitors extortion and data-leak sites and reviews public reporting to give clients early context on campaigns that touch their sector and supply chain. For this Flash Report, DeepSeas TIDE reviewed the n0n leak site directly on 14 October 2026, recording victim names, industries, countries, countdown timers and listing text only; no stolen data was accessed or downloaded. Vendor and customer relationships were mapped from public press releases, trade reporting and the vendor’s own published materials. CyberLogitec’s internet-facing attack surface was reviewed through a third-party attack-surface platform using passive external observations only; DeepSeas TIDE did not probe, scan or test any system. Victim names below are taken from n0n’s own listings and public trade-press coverage; listing on a leak site is a claim, not a confirmed breach.
Executive Summary
On 12 October 2026 the data-theft extortion group n0n added 38 maritime and logistics organizations to its leak site in a single batch: container terminals, shipping lines, ferry and tanker operators, port IT providers, agencies and 3PLs across 18 countries, 12 of them in South Korea. DeepSeas TIDE reviewed the site directly on 14 October 2026. All 38 listings share one publication deadline, 19 October 2026, 13:27 UTC, and ransom demands run from USD 600,000 to USD 14 million.
None of the 38 organizations has publicly confirmed a breach, and DeepSeas TIDE found no regulator filing or company disclosure for any of them between April and October 2026. Dongkuk Steel has stated it has confirmed no damage. The claims remain unverified.
The batch does not look like 38 separate intrusions. The shared deadline, small per-victim datasets and the type of data claimed (EDI message archives, terminal operating system (TOS) database scripts, configuration records) are consistent with a single upstream source. DeepSeas TIDE’s vendor mapping found that 26 of the 38 have a documented relationship with CyberLogitec (CLT), a Korean maritime software vendor, and 21 of them are named in CLT’s own company history, brochure or press releases. Every Korean and Brazilian terminal on the list is a CLT terminal operating system customer, and CLT’s customer list explains several listings that otherwise look out of place, such as a pulp-and-paper group and a palm-oil group. Maritime security firm Cydome has publicly raised the same possibility. Separately, a third-party attack-surface review identified concerning internet-facing exposures at CLT, including an outdated remote-access gateway, a plausible initial-access path into a vendor that administers many client environments. (Host-level detail is held in a restricted companion report.) CLT has not commented, the gateway has not been shown to be the entry point, and the link is unconfirmed.
Clients that use CLT products, share EDI or vendor access with CLT or its partners, or trade with any listed organization should treat this as a potential supply-chain exposure and act before the 19 October deadline.
Deadline
n0n publication deadline: 19 October 2026, 13:27 UTC
- Listed: 12 October 2026
- Organizations: 38 (single batch)
- Demands: USD 600K to 14M
- Confirmed breaches: None public
n0n states the full archive for every unpaid listing becomes downloadable at that time. Each listing offers a one-time option to pay 10% of the demand to open a private negotiation room. What is published on 19 October will be the first real test of the claims and of where the data came from.
- 38 — Maritime organizations in the batch
- 18 — Countries (per n0n’s labels)
- 26 — With a documented CLT relationship
- 0 — Public breach confirmations
Counts from DeepSeas TIDE review of the n0n leak site and public reporting, 14 October 2026. Some outlets count 37.
Background & Monitoring Timeline
- July 2026: CLT announces OPUS Terminal and digital-twin deployment at TTI Algeciras; Santos Brasil takes Tecon Imbituba live on a new terminal operating system (OPUS).
- September 2026: CLT announces OPUS Terminal M (cloud TOS) deployment at Shuwaikh Port, Kuwait.
- 18 September 2026: n0n first observed by public leak-site trackers. Public reporting describes initial access mainly through infostealer-harvested credentials.
- Early October 2026: CLT deploys an AI collision-prevention system at BNCT, integrated with OPUS Terminal.
- 12 October 2026: n0n posts 38 maritime and logistics organizations in one batch with a shared countdown. Nam Dinh Vu Port is posted about eight minutes before the rest.
- 13 October 2026: SOCRadar assesses the batch as unlikely to be 38 independent intrusions and points to a shared application or integration platform.
- 14 October 2026: Cydome publicly warns that a shared environment associated with CLT may have been compromised (unconfirmed). Trade press (The Loadstar, Splash247) and Korean press (Boannews) report the listings. Dongkuk Steel says it has confirmed no damage. DeepSeas TIDE reviews the leak site, maps vendor and customer links across the batch, and reviews CyberLogitec’s internet-facing attack surface via a third-party platform.
- 19 October 2026, 13:27 UTC: n0n’s stated publication deadline for all 38 listings.
Listed Organizations: Maritime Batch, 12 October 2026
Organization names, sectors and countries as labeled by n0n unless noted. Highlighted rows have a documented CyberLogitec (CLT) relationship. ‘CLT history’ means the organization is named in CLT’s own published company history; ‘CLT brochure’ means its 2018 customer logo list. ‘None found’ means no link was found in public sources, not that none exists.
| Organization | Country | Sector | CLT link | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pusan Newport Co. (PNC) | South Korea | Container terminal, Busan | OPUS Terminal (2008, CLT history) | DP World majority-owned (DP World is also a CLT customer). Claimed: TOS deployment and configuration records. |
| BNCT (Busan New Container Terminal) | South Korea | Container terminal, Busan | OPUS Terminal (2019, CLT history); CLT AI system (Oct 2026) | Claimed: 460 MB / 90 files of EDI messages, database scripts and systems documentation. Demand USD 8M. |
| GNCNet / DGT Busan | South Korea | Port IT / container terminal, Busan | OPUS Terminal / DigiPort (2022, CLT history) | ONE took a stake in DGT in March 2026. GNCNet not identified. |
| MGNP (Masan Gapo New Port) | South Korea | Container terminal, Changwon | OPUS Terminal M (2021) and OPUS Terminal (2022), CLT history | Claimed: invoice and billing-system material. |
| Santos Brasil | Brazil | Port operations | OPUS Terminal (2021, CLT history); Imbituba (Jul 2026) | CMA CGM 51%. Claimed: TOS database scripts and operational records. |
| Superterminais | Brazil | Container terminal, Manaus | OPUS Terminal M (2021, CLT history) | Claimed: EDI archives and interface records. |
| Portonave | Brazil | Container terminal, Navegantes | OPUS Terminal (2016, CLT history) | TiL / MSC owned. Claimed: TOS database material and EDI archives. |
| TTI Algeciras | Spain | Container terminal | OPUS Terminal (2010, CLT history); digital twin (Jul 2026) | HMM co-owned. Claimed: EDI archives and terminal systems documents. |
| Eurogate Tanger | Morocco | Container terminal | OPUS Terminal / DigiPort (2021, CLT history) | Demand USD 6M. |
| Asyaport | Turkey | Container terminal | OPUS Terminal (2014, CLT history); CLT brochure | Claimed: dangerous-goods records and database scripts. |
| Ocean Network Express (ONE) | Singapore | Container shipping | OPUS Container (2017, CLT history); ALLEGRO | Stake in DGT Busan; calls at Santos Brasil terminals. |
| CULines | China | Container shipping | ALLEGRO (2017, CLT history) | |
| Camellia Line | Japan | Ferry / RoRo | OPUS Container (2015, CLT history); CLT brochure | NYK-linked joint venture (Hakata to Busan). |
| Tsuneishi / Kambara Kisen | Japan | Shipbuilding / ship management | OPUS Container (2014); ALLEGRO, CARA, OPUS Stowage, SmartLink (2023), CLT history | Long-running CLT customer since 2013. |
| Polaris Shipping | South Korea | Dry bulk shipping | OPUS Bulk (2013, trade press) | |
| Yusen Logistics Hong Kong | Hong Kong | 3PL | OPUS demurrage & detention (2023, CLT history) | NYK group (NYK Line is also a CLT customer). |
| Apical Group | Singapore | Commodity processing / logistics | OPUS Terminal M for APICAL, Indonesia (2020, CLT history) | RGE group, same as APRIL. |
| April Asia | Indonesia | Listed as port agency | OPUS Terminal M for Riau Andalan Pulp and Paper (APRIL) (2019, CLT history) | APRIL Group (pulp and paper), RGE group. |
| NEOM Ports | Saudi Arabia | Industrial port operations | CLT customer (DeepSeas TIDE analyst verification) | Not in CLT’s history page; CLT history lists a different Saudi port (King Abdullah Port, 2013). Claimed: tariff and invoicing records. |
| Samudera Indonesia | Indonesia | Coastal shipping | CARA SaaS platform (live Feb 2020, CLT press release) | Deployed at Samudera Shipping Line, the group’s container-shipping arm. CARA is CLT’s multi-tenant SaaS platform. |
| Dong-A Tanker | South Korea | Oil tanker shipping | OPUS Bulk (May 2025, CLT press release) | Named ‘Donga Tanker’ by CLT. |
| T.S. Lines | Taiwan | Container shipping | ALLEGRO contract (June 2025, T.S. Lines news) | |
| Saehan Marine | South Korea | Ship agency | CLT user (DeepSeas TIDE analyst verification) | Claimed: disbursement records and banking templates. |
| ZPMC | China | Port machinery | CLT project partner: Beibu Gulf Qinzhou automated terminal (2021, CLT press release) | Partner, not a software customer. |
| T2S | Brazil | Port software integrator | CLT’s principal OPUS implementation partner in Brazil | T2S Tecnologia (Santos), not a terminal. Claimed: TOS gap-analysis documentation and databases. |
| EUSU Logistics | South Korea | Logistics | Same corporate group: CLT describes itself as a subsidiary of EUSU Holdings | Highest demand in batch (USD 14M). Claimed: infrastructure and file-server configuration records, vulnerability-check files. |
| BKH ICD | Malaysia (n0n says South Korea) | Inland container depot | Probable: OPUS Terminal M for PKT Group, Malaysia (2023, CLT history) | Bukit Kayu Hitam inland port is a PKT Logistics joint venture; whether the PKT deployment covers BKH ICD is unconfirmed. |
| ILCS Pelindo | Indonesia | Port IT / logistics platform | Probable: CLT systems at Pelindo terminals (Tanjung Priok CT9, Terminal M 2022; Panjang / Palembang 2015); IPC (Pelindo II) in CLT brochure | ILCS runs Pelindo’s port IT. Claimed: 2.4 GB of EDI archives and manifests. Demand USD 2.4M. |
| GCS Kuwait | Kuwait | Port community system | Possible: CLT OPUS Terminal M at Shuwaikh Port (Sep 2026) | Relationship to the Shuwaikh project unconfirmed. |
| Premier Alliance | Netherlands (per n0n) | Carrier alliance (HMM / ONE / Yang Ming) | Indirect, through ONE | Not a company; likely appears in the data rather than breached itself. |
| Nam Dinh Vu Port | Vietnam | Container terminal | None found | Gemadept group. Posted ~8 minutes before the rest of the batch. CLT has a Vietnam subsidiary (2018). |
| NCT Kandla | India | Container terminal | None found | |
| GlobalNet LCL | Indonesia | LCL / port agency | None found | |
| HPC Hamburg Port Consulting | Germany | Port consulting | None found | |
| Dongkuk Steel | South Korea | Steel (cargo owner) | None found | Company states no damage confirmed. Demand USD 10M. |
| Samjoo Maritime | South Korea | Ship management | None found | Demand USD 600K. |
| Korea Ferry | South Korea | Ferry | None found | Claimed: staff account records including credentials. |
| BMT IQ | United Kingdom (per n0n) | Listed as marine surveying | None found | Likely Basra Multipurpose Terminal, Iraq (bmtiq.com); claimed data fits a terminal. |
Claimed data types and demands from n0n listings as reported by ransomware.live, SOCRadar, Boannews, The Loadstar and Splash247, and from DeepSeas TIDE review of the BNCT listing. CLT links from CLT’s published company history and 2018 ALLEGRO brochure (both retrieved 14 October 2026), CLT press releases and trade press.
Findings & Context
One batch, one deadline: the listings point to a shared source
Bottom line: All 38 maritime listings were posted together and share a single countdown to 19 October 2026, 13:27 UTC. The datasets are small and of a similar kind, which fits one upstream collection point better than 38 separate compromises.
- DeepSeas TIDE observed identical countdown timers on every batch listing at the moment of capture; only Nam Dinh Vu Port differs, by about eight minutes. The four non-maritime victims on the same page (US, Australia) were posted in separate, earlier waves.
- Claimed volumes are small: 460 MB across 90 files for BNCT, about 60 MB for EUSU Logistics, 2.4 GB for ILCS Pelindo. A ‘complete terminal operations archive’ would normally be far larger.
- The claimed contents repeat across victims: EDI message archives, TOS database scripts, configuration records, gap-analysis documentation, invoices. That is the working set a terminal-software vendor or implementer holds for each customer.
- SOCRadar reports that many listed organizations have no matching credentials in infostealer logs, n0n’s usual route in, and found no link to the MOVEit or Cleo mass-exploitation campaigns.
- Several listings look like names found in a dataset rather than chosen targets: Premier Alliance is a carrier alliance, not a company; ‘BMT IQ’ is labeled a UK surveyor but most likely refers to an Iraqi terminal; BKH ICD is labeled South Korean but is in Malaysia; April Asia and Apical are a pulp-and-paper group and a palm-oil group, not port agencies.
CyberLogitec (CLT) customers make up most of the batch
Bottom line: 26 of the 38 listed organizations have a documented CyberLogitec (CLT) relationship, 21 of them named in CLT’s own company history, brochure or press releases. Two more are probable through their parent groups. CLT’s customer list also explains the listings that look out of place in a ‘ports’ batch. CLT has not commented and no source has confirmed a CLT compromise.
- Every terminal in Korea and Brazil on the list is a CLT customer. PNC (2008), BNCT (2019), DGT (2022) and Masan Gapo New Port (2021 to 2022) in Korea; Portonave (2016), Santos Brasil (2021) and Superterminais (2021) in Brazil. T2S, listed as a terminal, is T2S Tecnologia, CLT’s principal OPUS implementation partner in Brazil.
- The odd entries are CLT customers too. Apical and April Asia are not port operators, but CLT’s history lists OPUS Terminal M deployments for both groups’ Indonesian terminals (2019, 2020). Camellia Line and Kambara Kisen are long-running CLT customers. BKH ICD matches CLT’s 2023 deployment for Malaysia’s PKT Group, which co-owns the Bukit Kayu Hitam inland port; that also explains why its country label is wrong.
- Elsewhere: TTI Algeciras (2010), Asyaport (2014), Eurogate Tanger (2021), ONE and CULines (2017), Polaris Shipping (OPUS Bulk, 2013), Yusen Logistics (2023), Samudera (CARA, 2020), Dong-A Tanker (OPUS Bulk, 2025), T.S. Lines (ALLEGRO, 2025), and NEOM Ports and Saehan Marine (verified by DeepSeas TIDE). ZPMC is a CLT project partner on the Beibu Gulf Qinzhou automated terminal (2021). ILCS Pelindo is probable through CLT systems at Pelindo terminals. GCS Kuwait may relate to CLT’s September 2026 Shuwaikh Port deployment.
- Cloud-hosted product overlap. At least four listed organizations run OPUS Terminal M, CLT’s cloud-hosted terminal system: Superterminais, MGNP, Apical and April. BKH ICD and ILCS Pelindo are probable through their groups’ Terminal M deployments. Samudera uses CARA, which CLT describes as a multi-tenant SaaS platform. A shared hosted environment is the kind of single point that could expose many customers at once.
- Same group: CLT describes itself as a subsidiary of EUSU Holdings, the group EUSU Logistics belongs to. Its listing carries the batch’s highest demand (USD 14M) and claims infrastructure and file-server configuration records.
- Not yet linked: 8 organizations: Samjoo Maritime, Korea Ferry, Dongkuk Steel, GlobalNet LCL, NCT Kandla, Nam Dinh Vu, HPC and BMT IQ. Several were found to be CLT customers only through their own announcements or analyst checks, so some of these may be unpublished customers.
- Cydome publicly reached the same hypothesis on 14 October 2026 and stated that the breach source and extent are unconfirmed.
CLT’s internet-facing attack surface shows a plausible initial-access path
Bottom line: A third-party attack-surface platform reviewed CyberLogitec’s internet-facing infrastructure and found an external remote-access authentication gateway running an end-of-life software line, alongside other exposed management and demo systems. This is an exposure assessment, not evidence of compromise, but it describes the kind of front door that a data-theft actor would use to reach a vendor’s internal network and, from there, the client environments that vendor administers.
- Remote-access gateway, outdated software line. CLT fronts its remote access with an external authentication gateway whose software branch appears to have reached end-of-life and to no longer receive security updates (a provisional read of a passive banner, not an authoritative version string). The login requires a second factor, which raises the bar but does not remove the risk of an unpatched gateway. DeepSeas TIDE did not probe or test the system.
- Exposed management and demo systems. The review also reported internet-reachable management consoles and a labeled demo or sandbox environment, at least one appliance running on a certificate that lapsed in 2023 (a neglected-appliance signal). Exposed admin and demo systems widen the surface a vendor presents to the internet.
- Customer-facing CLT application portals are hosted in the same internet-facing environment.
- Why it matters for the batch. n0n’s reported access method is stolen credentials, and the claimed data (EDI archives, configuration records, database scripts) is the kind a vendor holds for many clients. An exposed, outdated remote-access gateway at that vendor is a credible route by which one access event could reach many client datasets. This is a plausibility finding that supports the shared-source and CLT assessments; it is not proof that this gateway was used.
- Host-level detail (specific addresses and services) is held in a restricted companion report available to named recipients under the information-sharing agreement.
- Caveat. These are external observations of a vendor’s publicly reachable services. Exposure is not compromise. Confirmation would require CLT’s own logs or an incident-response finding; DeepSeas TIDE recommends CLT and affected clients pursue that privately.
Customer and ownership overlap adds a second layer
Bottom line: Beyond the shared vendor, several listed organizations are tied by ownership or trade. These ties explain why some names appear together but are a weaker explanation for the batch than the CLT link.
- ONE: holds a stake in DGT Busan (March 2026), calls at Santos Brasil terminals, and is a CLT ALLEGRO customer.
- HMM: co-owns TTI Algeciras and co-operates the HMM/ONE ‘FIL2’ Asia to South America service calling at Tecon Santos. Premier Alliance (HMM, ONE, Yang Ming) is listed as a victim.
- NYK group: Yusen Logistics, ONE (NYK is a shareholder) and Camellia Line (NYK-linked joint venture) all appear.
- RGE group: April Asia (APRIL) and Apical.
Listing format and payment mechanics
Bottom line: n0n runs a high-volume, low-touch operation: templated listing text, USD demands converted to bitcoin at one rate, and automated on-chain payment checks with a paid entry fee to negotiate.
- The BNCT listing demands USD 8,000,000 (about 76 BTC) to a listed bitcoin address, or a one-time 10% payment (7.6 BTC) to unlock a private negotiation room. Reported PNC figures (USD 12M, about 114 BTC) imply the same exchange rate, consistent with template pricing.
- As of 14 October 2026 the BNCT payment address has no on-chain transactions.
- Listing text is generic. Each batch entry carries an auto-generated sector descriptor (e.g. ‘(container terminal operations)’), several of which are inaccurate.
DeepSeas TIDE Assessment: Shared Source (confidence: medium)
DeepSeas TIDE assesses with medium confidence that n0n obtained the 38 maritime listings from a single upstream source, such as a vendor, integrator or shared platform, rather than through 38 independent intrusions. Some listed names likely appear only as references in that data and were not themselves breached.
Basis:
- All 38 listings were posted together with one shared deadline (DeepSeas TIDE direct observation).
- Small, similar per-victim datasets made up of EDI archives, TOS database scripts and configuration records.
- SOCRadar finds no matching infostealer credentials for many listed victims, n0n’s usual access route.
- Mislabeled or non-company entries (Premier Alliance, BMT IQ, April Asia, BKH ICD’s country) fit names harvested from a dataset rather than chosen by sector.
What would change this assessment: A shared deadline shows only that the listings were published together, not that the data was taken together; n0n’s reported infostealer-credential access could also have produced separate intrusions accumulated over weeks and released as one batch. Confidence would rise if the 19 October publication shows files from several victims with shared paths, authorship or templates. It would fall if published data contains victim-internal material (mailboxes, HR, finance shares) or if multiple victims confirm separate intrusions.
DeepSeas TIDE Assessment: CyberLogitec Link (confidence: high)
DeepSeas TIDE assesses with high confidence that the n0n maritime batch has a CyberLogitec (CLT) nexus: most listed organizations are CLT customers, partners or group companies, and the collection most likely traces to an environment associated with CLT (for example a hosted OPUS Terminal M or CARA environment, a support or project repository, an implementation partner such as T2S Tecnologia, or CLT’s corporate group) rather than to 38 independent intrusions. On the narrower question of whether CLT’s own systems were breached, DeepSeas TIDE holds medium confidence: that is unconfirmed and could still be explained by CLT’s public customer list being used to build a target list.
Basis:
- 26 of 38 listed organizations have a documented CLT relationship (21 named in CLT’s own history, brochure or press releases), including every Korean and Brazilian terminal on the list; 2 more are probable through parent groups.
- CLT’s Brazilian implementation partner and a company in CLT’s corporate group are both listed; the group company carries the highest demand and claims configuration and vulnerability-check files.
- Claimed data types (TOS database scripts, EDI archives, gap-analysis and configuration documentation) match what a TOS vendor or implementer holds per customer.
- Non-port listings (Apical, April, Kambara Kisen, Camellia Line, BKH ICD) are explained by CLT’s customer list and not by sector targeting.
- Cydome independently reached the same hypothesis on 14 October 2026.
What would change this assessment: The CLT nexus is well established; the open question is mechanism. An external attack-surface review found an exposed, end-of-life CLT remote-access gateway, a plausible path but not proof of use. CLT’s published customer history could instead have served as a target list for separate credential-based intrusions, producing the same overlap without a CLT breach. The breach question would resolve upward if CLT or a listed customer confirms vendor-side exposure, or if the 19 October publication shows CLT project or multi-client material; it would fall if victims confirm separate, unrelated intrusions.
Investigated, Not Connected
- Public disclosures: no company statement, regulator filing (including Brazil’s CVM and ANPD, Korea’s KISA and PIPC) or confirmed breach found for any of the 38 organizations, April to October 2026. One unnamed Korean listed company told press that KISA had notified it and it is still checking.
- Hamburg Port Consulting as the common source: considered and not supported. No consulting relationship with the other listed terminals was found.
- Other common vendors: no shared link found through Navis, Total Soft Bank or ZPMC equipment across the listed terminals. Verification of the 8 unlinked organizations is in progress.
- Earlier incidents: older, unrelated claims exist against Pelindo (LockBit, 2023), Yusen Logistics (ALPHV, 2023) and Basra Multipurpose Terminal (Midas, 2022). A March 2026 Payload claim against ‘TS Lines Philippines’ could not be tied to T.S. Lines. None is linked to this batch.
- Payment activity: the BNCT payment address shows no transactions as of 14 October 2026.
Recommended Actions
Immediate: before 19 October 2026, 13:27 UTC
- Identify any CLT footprint: OPUS Terminal or Terminal M, ALLEGRO, OPUS Bulk, OPUS demurrage & detention, DigiPort, and any CLT implementation partner (including T2S Tecnologia). Include hosted or cloud tenants and support contracts.
- Review and rotate vendor access: CLT and partner remote-support accounts, VPN profiles, cloud tenant administrators, and the credentials, keys and certificates used for EDI connections (SFTP, AS2, API). Enforce MFA on all vendor access paths.
- Run a look-back in your own telemetry for the last 60 to 90 days: vendor-account logins from new locations or at unusual times, bulk access to EDI archives or file shares, and large outbound transfers from systems the vendor can reach.
- Check for infostealer exposure of staff and vendor accounts, n0n’s reported initial-access method, and reset any exposed credentials.
Near term
- Ask CLT and partners for a written statement on whether their environments are affected and what client data they hold.
- Expect invoice and payment fraud. If you trade with any listed organization, warn finance and operations teams: claimed data includes invoices, disbursement records and banking templates that support convincing business email compromise lures. Verify any change to payment details out of band.
- Prepare for publication. Brief legal and communications teams on what partner or vendor data may appear on 19 October, and route any decision on contact with the actor through counsel.
- Contact your DeepSeas representative with questions or if your organization is listed or uses CLT products.
Indicators
Tracking indicators, not blocking indicators. The payment address is recorded for monitoring on-chain activity.
n0n leak site (Tor):
nongzecboljwv3yfndkggsybsglfrkffw7bvk2zemuteoxe6etpusnad[.]onion
Bitcoin payment address (BNCT listing; no transactions as of 14 Oct 2026):
bc1qldy6h5zlv0aqhyyxwfsra3gqjw694yfj8rtl83
Sources
- DeepSeas TIDE direct review of the n0n leak site and BNCT listing, 14 October 2026
- Digital Ship: Cydome warns of alleged CyberLogitec breach affecting 37 maritime organisations (14 Oct 2026)
- The Loadstar: Cyber crime group hits 38 shipping and port groups (14 Oct 2026)
- Splash247: Shipping firms and ports caught in mass cyber extortion claim
- Boannews (Korean)
- NewsJournalism: Dongkuk Steel response (Korean)
- SOCRadar: n0n group profile
- ransomware.live: n0n
- Maritime Executive: Pusan Newport and CyberLogitec
- Maritime Executive: BNCT selects CyberLogitec OPUS
- Container News: Dongwon Global Terminal selects CyberLogitec TOS
- Container Magazine: ONE acquires stake in Dongwon Global Terminal Busan
- CyberLogitec: Santos Brasil press release
- Port Technology: CyberLogitec and Super Terminais OPUS deal
- SantaPortal: T2S as port systems integrator (Portuguese)
- Container News: CyberLogitec at TTI Algeciras
- Container News: CyberLogitec at Shuwaikh Port, Kuwait
- Ship Technology: CyberLogitec and EUSU
- CyberLogitec: Company history (customer deployments 2008 to 2023, retrieved 14 Oct 2026)
- CyberLogitec: ALLEGRO brochure, 2018 (customer logo list)
- CyberLogitec: Donga Tanker adopts OPUS Bulk (13 May 2025)
- CyberLogitec: Samudera Shipping Line deploys CARA (6 May 2020)
- CyberLogitec: Beibu Gulf Port Group selects OPUS Terminal, with ZPMC (7 Jul 2021)
- T.S. Lines news: ALLEGRO contract with CyberLogitec (30 Jun 2025)
- Cypro: n0n claim names BMT IQ
DeepSeas TIDE will continue monitoring the n0n leak site and the BNCT payment address through the 19 October 2026 deadline, and will issue an update if data is published, a listed organization or CLT confirms a breach, or the source of the batch is established.
Classification
