PhantomPolia, Expanded: The Remus Stealer Infrastructure Nobody Is Blocking Yet
DeepSeas TIDEThreat Intelligence Discovery and ExploitationLevelBlue SpiderLabs’ PhantomPolia writeup names 18 attacker domains. DeepSeas TIDE’s telemetry on the same operation carries 26 and counting, including five live staging domains that sit on no blocklist and seven active command-and-control domains the public writeup does not name. Here is what we added, why it matters, and what to block today.
DeepSeas TIDE (Threat Intelligence Discovery & Exploitation) · 08 October 2026 · TLP:CLEAR
On 07 October 2026, LevelBlue SpiderLabs published Inside PhantomPolia: Remus Stealer Delivery via Donut Shellcode in ClickFix Campaign, a detailed analysis of a ClickFix operation that delivers Remus Stealer through compromised websites and uses a smart contract on the Ethereum Sepolia test network as a dead-drop resolver for its next-stage domain. It is a thorough piece of work and the place to start if you want the malware internals.
This post is about the infrastructure. DeepSeas TIDE has been tracking this cluster since July 2026: the first dead-drop domain was rated high risk in our telemetry on 11 July, 88 days before the public writeup. In the day since publication we re-swept the whole operation with a live scan. The short version is that the infrastructure that matters most right now is the infrastructure nobody is flagging yet.
At a glance
| Public reporting (07 Oct 2026) | DeepSeas TIDE (08 Oct 2026) | |
|---|---|---|
| Attacker-controlled domains in the campaign’s three tiers | 18 | 26+, plus 15 further Remus C2 domains sharing the operator’s servers (7 of them active) |
| Dead-drop (staging) domains | 7 | 12, all live; 5 appear on no blocklist and carry no risk designation anywhere |
| Remus C2 beacon ports | 1 | 8 |
| Remus C2 hosts | — | 6 across 5 providers, all active on 08 Oct 2026 |
| Live delivery domains with no risk designation from any source | Named, not flagged as unprotected | 5, first blocklisted on 08 Oct 2026, the day after publication |
| Earliest high-risk designation | — | 11 July 2026 |
How the chain works
PhantomPolia runs in three infrastructure tiers, each registered and hosted differently, which is why it needs three different blocking strategies.
1. Compromised website Entry point An injected JavaScript loader runs in the visitor’s browser.
2. Ethereum Sepolia contract Dead-drop resolver The loader reads an encrypted configuration from a smart contract through public RPC endpoints and decrypts the next-stage domain in the browser.
3. Dead-drop domainTier 1 · staging Serves a second-stage script that profiles the visitor and renders the ClickFix “Verifying” prompt.
4. Delivery domainTier 2 · payload The pasted PowerShell command fetches /check/update.ps1, then an encrypted stage, an AutoIt bundle and finally Remus Stealer.
5. Remus C2Tier 3 · exfiltration The stealer beacons to command-and-control domains on fixed, non-standard ports.
What DeepSeas TIDE added
Five more staging domains, and none of them is on any list
Every dead-drop domain sits behind Cloudflare and serves an unmodified Apache default page. The page on its own is useless as a selector: it appears on more than 42,000 domains in DeepSeas TIDE data. What makes the cluster visible is a detail the origin server leaks through Cloudflare: the file timestamp on that default page. Only two values appear across the whole cluster, each corresponding to one operator staging host, and each lines up with a batch of domains registered within minutes of one another at a single Hong Kong registrar (05 June 2026 for the .top names, 27 July 2026 for the .com names).
Pairing the page with the origin timestamp narrows 42,000 domains to 12. Seven are in the public reporting. Five are not, and as of 08 October 2026 those five carry no risk designation in any reputation source we track, including our own scoring, and appear on no blocklist. A live scan on 08 October confirmed all 12 still responding and serving the same staging page they have served since the hosts were built in June and July. The scan also produced a second, independent fingerprint that splits the cluster the same way: the two staging hosts answer error requests with different web-server builds, and each presents one server product on its home page and a different one on its error page. That inconsistency survives the operator editing the home page, which makes it the more durable hunting selector of the two.
DeepSeas TIDE assessment. We assess with very high confidence that all 12 dead-drop domains belong to one operator running two staging hosts. The assessment rests on three independent observations that agree: minute-level registration batching at a single registrar, a byte-identical page, and matching origin file timestamps, with the web-server build difference corroborating the two-host split. The strongest alternative, a shared hosting image that would give unrelated customers the same page and timestamp, does not fit: a vendor image timestamp would not fall 31 minutes after this operator’s own registration batch, and a shared image would not produce two different server builds aligned exactly to the two timestamp groups.
The delivery domains ran for weeks without a single signal
The domains that serve the malicious PowerShell command are the live end of the chain, and they are the weakest point in public coverage. Five of the delivery domains named in the public report first appeared on a blocklist on 08 October 2026, the day after publication, and none of the five has ever carried a risk designation from any source. They were registered between 31 August and 19 September 2026, so they operated for between 19 and 37 days with no public signal at all. DeepSeas TIDE assesses with high confidence that these are the active end of the delivery chain, and they are the highest-priority blocking candidates in this post.
The delivery tier is registered differently from the staging tier, across at least five registrars, which is why registrar pivots do little here. Pivoting instead on the page content hash of the “Verifying” lure surfaced three further hosts not in the public reporting: two attacker-registered lure domains and a subdomain of a legitimate, high-traffic third-party website that we assess as compromised rather than attacker-owned. We are not naming the third party here; the specific host and path are available to DeepSeas MDR customers.
One of the new lure domains, berrysoai[.]com, was live on 08 October serving the lure’s page title but bouncing every visitor straight to a major vendor’s homepage, with search indexing suppressed. DeepSeas TIDE assesses with moderate confidence that this is a lure host held in a cloaked or dormant state: armed and certificated, serving a benign redirect to anyone who does not match its targeting. The alternative is an abandoned host left pointing somewhere harmless. A single snapshot cannot separate the two, and the domain should be blocked either way.
Eight C2 ports, not one, and the port outlives the host
The command-and-control tier does not use the Cloudflare pattern. These domains resolve to rented virtual private servers across five providers and were registered through a bulk registrar whose default nameservers carry more than a million domains, so nameserver correlation is useless on this tier. All six hosts carry DeepSeas TIDE’s Remus Stealer family designation, are identified as botnet command-and-control in our telemetry, are rated high risk, and were on a blocklist before the public writeup. All six were still active on 08 October. Pivoting on those hosts surfaced seven additional active C2 domains that match the operator’s naming scheme and do not appear in the public reporting, plus eight more that are now dormant or historical and are listed at the end of this post for retrospective hunting.
Public reporting names one beacon port. DeepSeas TIDE holds eight: 3215, 3546, 5003, 6929, 7289, 8213, 9173 and 9895.
Key finding. Each Remus C2 domain is pinned to a fixed non-standard port that survives migration to new hosting. One domain moved between two providers and kept port 8213; another moved between two other providers and kept port 7289. DeepSeas TIDE assesses with high confidence that the beacon port is a per-domain constant in the operator’s builder configuration, re-deployed unchanged onto new hosting; matching service build fingerprints across the same host pairs corroborate this. The practical consequence is that a port-based detection keeps firing after the operator rotates IP addresses. An IP blocklist does not.
Where that leaves things on 08 October
Active means observed resolving or serving within the last 48 hours, or confirmed responding by live scan on 08 October 2026. Dormant means last observed between 7 and 35 days ago and not confirmed live. Historical means last observed more than 35 days ago.
| Tier | Active | Dormant | Historical |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dead-drop domains | 12 | 0 | 0 |
| Delivery and lure hosts | 8 | 2 | 0 |
| C2 domains | 11 | 5 | 1 |
| C2 hosts | 6 | 0 | 0 |
The entire dead-drop tier is live and unmodified. Two delivery domains have gone quiet, one of them under a registrar hold, which points to a takedown rather than the operator walking away. All six C2 hosts remain active, and two of them still serve newly identified domains that are not publicly reported.
What to block
Three lists, in priority order. Highlighted rows do not appear in the public reporting. Indicators are defanged for publication. “None yet” under risk designation means no reputation source we track, including our own scoring, has rated the indicator: the rating pipelines have not caught up, which is exactly why these need a deliberate block rather than a feed.
Not in the public reporting
1. Command-and-control: highest priority
Blocking here stops exfiltration after a successful infection.
| Domain | Risk designation | Public reporting | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| spogear[.]click | High | Yes | Beacon port 3546 |
| cruahop[.]shop | High | Yes | Beacon port 8213, kept across a hosting move |
| drepace[.]click | High | Yes | Beacon port 7289, kept across a hosting move |
| oceanvw[.]click | High | Yes | Beacon port 3215 |
| uniqion[.]click | High | No | Active on a Remus C2 host |
| shozter[.]shop | High | No | Active on a Remus C2 host |
| ventuxe[.]biz | High | No | Active on a Remus C2 host |
| estranat[.]biz | High | No | Active on a Remus C2 host |
| trsries[.]click | High | No | Active on a Remus C2 host |
| srtylab[.]shop | High | No | Active on a Remus C2 host |
| teechop[.]shop | High | No | Active on a Remus C2 host |
| C2 host | Risk designation | Beacon ports observed |
|---|---|---|
| 137.184.108[.]14 | High | 3546, 6929, 9173, 9895 |
| 143.244.141[.]187 | High | 5003, 8213 |
| 145.223.23[.]25 | High | 3215 |
| 88.99.59[.]43 | High | 8213 |
| 45.77.68[.]157 | High | 7289 |
One address needs a decision rather than a rule. 198.177.124[.]177 is rated high risk and hosts an active C2 domain on port 7289, but it also hosts at least five unrelated, long-lived domains belonging to an apparent media service. Block the domain and the port pair rather than the address outright, unless your environment has no legitimate reason to reach it.
2. Delivery and lure
These serve the PowerShell retrieval path or the ClickFix lure. Most controls will not catch the first five yet.
| Domain | Risk designation | Public reporting | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| workeslexamp[.]com | None yet | Yes | Active; first blocklisted 08 Oct 2026 |
| spaceclou[.]com | None yet | Yes | Active; first blocklisted 08 Oct 2026 |
| littworkers[.]com | None yet | Yes | Active; first blocklisted 08 Oct 2026 |
| littnetworks[.]com | None yet | Yes | Active; first blocklisted 08 Oct 2026 |
| cokakina[.]com | None yet | Yes | Active; first blocklisted 08 Oct 2026 |
| zaluposs[.]com | High | No | Active lure host |
| berrysoai[.]com | None yet | No | Active; cloaked, redirecting visitors to a vendor homepage on 08 Oct 2026 |
| citywebntw[.]com | High | Yes | Dormant, under registrar hold; block for completeness |
| cloudcheckic[.]com | High | Yes | Dormant since 16 Sep 2026; block for completeness |
The lure was also observed on a subdomain of a legitimate, high-traffic website that we assess as a compromised third party. Where you have that host, block the specific hostname and the lure path only. Do not block the parent domain.
3. Dead-drop tier
All 12 are live. The five without a designation are the ones your existing feeds will miss.
| Domain | Risk designation | Public reporting | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| voderlence[.]com | High | Yes | Active |
| velnoderic[.]com | High | Yes | Active |
| nightflamevortex[.]top | High | Yes | Active |
| voidravenstorm[.]top | High | Yes | Active |
| ironphantomcore[.]top | High | Yes | Active |
| stormvenomforge[.]top | High | Yes | Active |
| shadowemberstrike[.]top | High | Yes | Active |
| zaevoderix[.]com | None yet | No | Active; confirmed live 08 Oct 2026 |
| nyxovarel[.]com | None yet | No | Active; confirmed live 08 Oct 2026 |
| draxevion[.]com | None yet | No | Active; confirmed live 08 Oct 2026 |
| aexodervian[.]com | None yet | No | Active; confirmed live 08 Oct 2026 |
| emberwolfhaven[.]top | None yet | No | Active; confirmed live 08 Oct 2026 |
What not to block
Blocking any of the following causes collateral damage without reducing risk.
| Indicator | Why | Do this instead |
|---|---|---|
| 0xrpc.io | Shared public blockchain RPC service | Alert on access from endpoints |
| 1rpc.io | Shared public blockchain RPC service | Alert on access from endpoints |
| eth-sepolia-testnet.api.pocket.network | Shared public blockchain RPC service | Alert on access from endpoints |
| 185.53.179[.]128 | Bulk domain parking, more than 8.9 million domains | Exclude from blocking |
| Cloudflare edge addresses | Shared CDN fronting the dead-drop tier | Exclude from blocking; block the domains |
| The compromised third-party website | Legitimate high-traffic site, assessed as a victim | Block the lure host and path only |
| Co-tenants on the C2 hosts | Unrelated long-lived domains, assessed as victims | Investigate, do not block |
The three blockchain endpoints are the highest-value alert in this set. A Windows endpoint making a remote procedure call to an Ethereum test network is anomalous in almost every enterprise, and it happens at the very first stage of this chain, before any attacker-owned domain is contacted.
Detections that outlive the infrastructure
Domains and addresses rotate. These do not. Deploy all five.
- Ethereum test-network calls from endpoints. Alert on any endpoint process issuing an RPC call to 0xrpc.io, 1rpc.io or eth-sepolia-testnet.api.pocket.network. This fires at stage one, before any attacker domain is resolved.
- Beacon ports. Alert on outbound connections to ports 3215, 3546, 5003, 6929, 7289, 8213, 9173 and 9895. The port survives host rotation, so this rule outlives the address list.
- Delivery paths. Alert on retrieval of
/check/update.ps1from any host, and on the visitor-registration path containing/api/v1/statistics/visitwith astatparameter. - Execution pattern. Alert on PowerShell launched with a hidden window and an execution-policy bypass that pipes a web request into an expression evaluator, and on
AutoIt3.exeexecuting a script from a randomly named temporary directory. - The paste step. Monitor the Run-dialog command history registry key (RunMRU) for entries invoking a scripting interpreter. This captures the copy-and-paste action the lure depends on, whatever the domain of the day.
For retrospective hunting
These C2 domains are dormant or historical and are included for hunting across stored logs rather than for active blocking. One exception: any organisation with log retention covering July 2026 onward should hunt zelpx[.]garden, which carried DeepSeas TIDE’s Remus Stealer designation from 14 July 2026 and is the earliest indicator in this cluster.
| Domain | Risk designation | Last observed |
|---|---|---|
| zelpx[.]garden | High | 07 Sep 2026 |
| darkfot[.]click | High | 03 Sep 2026 |
| smaring[.]shop | High | 16 Sep 2026 |
| obutdor[.]shop | High | 25 Sep 2026 |
| pulsrend[.]click | None yet | 30 Sep 2026 |
| greepot[.]click | None yet | 29 Sep 2026 |
| vibrisk[.]click | None yet | 02 Oct 2026 |
| falcoju[.]shop | High | 03 Jun 2026 |
What we are watching next
Nearly the whole dead-drop tier rotated its TLS certificates inside roughly eight hours spanning 01 and 02 October 2026. A repeat of that clustered reissue is an early indicator of the next wave, and DeepSeas TIDE is treating it as a tripwire alongside a recurring sweep on the origin fingerprint described above. The public reporting published seven Ethereum Sepolia contract addresses used as dead-drop resolvers; at least four more are expected to correspond to the newly surfaced .com staging domains and have not yet been recovered. Recovering them would provide the most durable tracking anchor in this chain, since a contract address cannot be re-registered or moved.
A note for DeepSeas MDR customers
Every indicator recommended for blocking in this post, including the domains and hosts that do not appear in the public reporting and the compromised third-party host we have not named here, is already loaded into DeepSeas MDR customers’ systems. No action is needed to ingest them. If you want to confirm coverage, discuss the behavioural detections above, or request a look-back in your own telemetry, contact your DeepSeas representative.
Source for the public reporting: LevelBlue SpiderLabs, Inside PhantomPolia: Remus Stealer Delivery via Donut Shellcode in ClickFix Campaign, 07 October 2026. All other ratings, telemetry, registration data, live-scan results and assessments in this post are DeepSeas TIDE’s own, current as of 08 October 2026. All dates are UTC. Indicators are defanged; replace [.] with . before use.
Classification
